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Abstract
Differential privacy allows quantifying privacy loss from com-
putations on sensitive personal data. This loss grows with the
number of accesses to the data, making it hard to open the use
of such data while respecting privacy. To avoid this limitation,
we propose privacy-preserving release of a synthetic version of
a data set, which can be used for an unlimited number of analy-
ses with any methods, without affecting the privacy guarantees.
The synthetic data generation is based on differentially private
learning of a generative probabilistic model which can capture
the probability distribution of the original data. We demonstrate
empirically that we can reliably reproduce statistical discoveries
from the synthetic data. We expect the method to have broad use
in sharing anonymized versions of key data sets for research.
1 Introduction
Open release of data would be beneficial for research but is not
feasible for sensitive data, for instance clinical and genomic data.
Since reliably anonymizing individual data entries is hard, releas-
ing synthetic microdata [25] has been proposed as an alternative.
To maximize the utility of the data, the distribution of the re-
leased synthetic data should be as close as possible to that of the
original data set, but synthetic examples that are too close to real
individuals could compromise their privacy. Traditional meth-
ods of statistical disclosure limitation cannot provide rigorous
guarantees on the risk [3]. However, differential privacy (DP)
provides a natural means of obtaining such guarantees.
DP [12, 11] provides a statistical definition of privacy and
anonymity. It gives strict controls on the risk that an individual
can be identified from the result of an algorithm operating on
personal data. Formally, a randomized algorithmM is (, δ)-DP,
if for all data sets X,X ′, where X and X ′ agree in all but one
entry, and for all possible outputs S ofM, it satisfies
Pr(M(X) ∈ S) ≤ e Pr(M(X ′) ∈ S) + δ, (1)
where 0 ≤ δ < 1. The non-negative parameters , δ define the
strength of the guarantee, with smaller values indicating stronger
guarantees. The privacy is usually achieved by introducing noise
into the algorithms. DP has many desirable properties such as
composability: combining results of several DP algorithms is
still DP, with privacy guarantees depending on how they are
applied [12, 15]. Another important property of DP is invariance
to post-processing [14], which assures that the privacy guarantees
of a DP result remain valid after any post-processing. Thus we
can use the results of a DP algorithm to answer future queries
under the same privacy guarantees.
Using DP for releasing synthetic microdata was first sug-
gested by Blum et. al [7] for binary data sets. Since then, multiple
privacy-preserving data release techniques have been proposed
[13, 26, 6, 9, 16]. However, the methods have so far been lim-
ited to special cases such as discrete data [13, 26, 6, 9, 16], or
by other limitations such as having to draw a synthetic data set
from noisy histograms [26]. More recent work has employed
more powerful models [4, 2], but these methods are limited in
another way, namely in not being able to use prior knowledge
about the structure of the data set. Using prior knowledge can
enable learning for small or medium-sized data sets, which are
an important but difficult case.
Dwork et al. [13] showed theoretically that there is no com-
putationally efficient DP method for data sharing that would
preserve all properties of the data. They consider the problem
from the learning theory perspective, where the aim is to ac-
curately answer a set of queries. Accurate answers become
infeasible as the size of this query set grows. However, if we
only need to preserve the most important properties of the data,
the set of queries we want to accurately anwer stays bounded in
size, giving a way out. We argue that it would already be highly
useful to be able to answer questions of the important properties;
and moreover, the bigger picture may be more relevant than all
the unique characteristics in the data.
A successful method for DP data sharing in a continuous
or high-dimensional space, where finite data sets are sparse, re-
quires a means of smoothing the data that preserves the important
properties of the data. We propose to solve this by using prob-
abilistic models that provide a natural language for describing
how the data have been generated. When the generative model
learned under DP is used to sample a new synthetic data set, the
data can be released with no further privacy issues. Furthermore,
the synthetic data will lie in the same domain as the original data
which allows any processing to be applied on the synthetic data
in the same way as on the original data.
There has been some recent work on using specific generative
machine learning models for DP data sharing. Mixtures of neural
networks (NN) were proposed by Acs et al. [4] and Abay et
al. [2]. Both of these solutions are based on splitting the training
data into subsets of similar entries, and learning a NN for each
of these subsets. Several attempts for DP data sharing using
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Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [5, 27] have also been
proposed. Although GANs are known for generating highly
photorealistic natural images, they are poor in matching the
entire data distribution [24] and their performance under DP is
limited.
The aforementioned techniques are based on deep learning,
which allows approximation of the generative process using
black box function estimators. Probabilistic modelling, where
the data is given a hierarchical model, gives another approach
for synthetic data release. The previous attempts for data sharing
via probabilistic modelling have focused on generating data from
graphical models [28, 20]. While these solutions allow incorpo-
rating prior knowledge into the modelling, they suffer from the
computational cost that comes from learning graphical models.
In this paper we formulate the principle of Bayesian DP data
release, which employs a generative probabilistic model and
hence turns synthetic data release into a modeling problem. We
demonstrate how to successfully apply it with a general purpose
model family. We show empirically that the synthetic data set is
similar to the original one both in terms of statistical similarity
metrics and, even more importantly, statistical discoveries can be
reproduced from the synthetic data. Code for applying the princi-
ple across model families and data sets is available at https://
github.com/DPBayes/data-sharing-examples.
2 Results
2.1 Overview of methods used in experiments
Our aim is to release a new synthetic data set that preserves the
statistical properties of the original data set while satisfying DP
guarantees. Consider a data set X and a probabilistic model
p(X | θ) with parameters θ. Our aim is to release a new
synthetic data set X˜ by learning a data-generating model based
on the original data. We use the posterior predictive distribution
p(X˜ | X) (PPD) to generate the synthetic data
p(X˜ | X) =
∫
Supp(θ)
p(X˜ | θ)p(θ | X)dθ. (2)
PPD tells us the probability of observing a new sample condi-
tioned on the data we have obtained thus far. Therefore, if our
hierarchical model sufficiently captures the generative process,
the PPD is the natural choice for generating the synthetic data.
We sample the synthetic data from the posterior predictive
distribution, by first drawing θ˜ from the posterior distribution
p(θ | X) and then drawing new data sample x˜ from the proba-
bilistic model conditioned on θ˜.
2.2 Reproducing statistical discoveries from the
synthetic data
To test whether the same discoveries can be made from the
synthetic as from the original data set, we generated a synthetic
data set based on an epidemiological set [8], using a general-
purpose generative model family (mixture model).
The data have previously been used to study the associa-
tion between diabetes and alcohol related deaths (ARD) using a
Poisson regression model [22]. We fit a similar Poisson regres-
sion model to the synthetic data and compared the regression
coefficients against coefficients from the original data.
From the synthetic data, we discover that the diabetics have
a higher risk for ARD than the non-diabetics, which agrees with
previous results on the original data [22]. Figure 1 shows that
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Figure 1: Likelihood of reproducing findings from synthetic
data, ARD study. For males (226 372 samples), the previous
discoveries can be reproduced with high probability from the
synthetic data. For females (208 148 samples), the probability of
reproducing discoveries is lower. Bars show discoveries for each
type of diabetes medication separately, and for all combined.
In the combined case, for a reproduced discovery, we required
the association between ARD and medication type to be found
for all medication types with significance (p < 0.05). Results
of 100 independent repeats of the method with privacy level
( = 1.0, δ = 10−6).
under a reasonable level of privacy ( = 1), we can reproduce
the discoveries with high probability for males. For the female
case the rate of reproduction is lower because the signal in the
data is weaker and rate of reproduction is less than 70% even
when just bootstrapping the data.
To understand the difference between the two cases (males,
females), we note the much smaller sample size for ARD in-
cidences among females (520 vs 2 312). Since DP guarantees
indistinguishability among individuals in the data set, it is plausi-
ble that the rarer a characteristic, the less well it can be preserved
in DP-protected data. To assess whether this holds for the regres-
sion coefficients in the ARD study, we divided the regression
coefficients, both male and female, into four equal-sized bins of
corresponding number of cases and computed the mean abso-
lute error between the original and synthetic coefficients within
these bins. Figure 2 shows that the regression coefficients with
higher number of cases are more accurately discovered from the
synthetic data.
To further illustrate the results, Figure 3 shows the actual
regression coefficients. Most of the coefficients for males are
almost indistinguishable from the true regression coefficients.
The fit for females is not quite as good, but still most of the
regression coefficients were recovered with high accuracy.
2.3 Scalability and choice of probabilistic model
Sharing data via probabilistic modelling allows us to incorporate
prior beliefs of the data generating mechanism into the learning
process. We next demonstrate that the choice of probabilistic
model has a large impact on how the synthetic data preserves
properties of the original.
We test the effect of the probabilistic model by comparing
results obtained from synthetic data of two different probabilistic
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Figure 2: Accuracy of findings from synthetic data as a func-
tion of their rarity, ARD study. Accuracy of regression co-
efficients learned from synthetic data rapidly improves as the
number of relevant examples grows. The curves show mean ab-
solute error between the original the learned coefficients within
a number of cases bin. Average result over 100 independent runs
of the algorithm. Tickmarks on the x-axis are (min, max) of
relevant examples within the respective bin. Error bars denote
the standard error of mean. Results shown for three values of the
privacy parameter .
models, mixture model and private Bayes networks [28]. We
evaluate the performance of both models on three data sets, the
ARD (epidemiological) data, a mobile phone app data set [23]
referred to as Carat, and the publicly available UCI Adult data
set [10].
With Carat data set, we measured the similarity of original
and synthetic data sets in terms of Frobenius norm (see Equation
4) between their covariance matrices. Figure 4 shows that the
Bayes network is really accurate when the dimensionality of
low, but as the dimensionality of the data grows, synthetic data
generated from the mixture model achieves higher accuracy than
data from Bayes networks, which also becomes computationally
exhausting as the dimension increases. From Figure 4, we can
see that learning the mixture model takes only a fraction of the
Bayes networks computational time.
Similarly, in the ARD study, the mixture models perform
better than the Bayes networks approach (Figure 5).
Finally, we compared the two probabilistic models in a clas-
sification task using the Adult data set. After learning the gener-
ative model, we used the synthetic data obtained from the gen-
erative model to train a logistic regression classifier and demon-
strated the performance by predicting income classes. Figure 6b
illustrates that in this example, the Bayes networks outperforms
the mixture model in terms of classification accuracy.
2.4 Performance against tailored mechanism
As discussed, one of the greatest advantages of releasing a syn-
thetic data set is that it can be used in arbitrary tasks without
further privacy concerns. With earlier techniques, if a data holder
wants to allow queries to be performed on a sensitive data set,
while assuring DP, they need to set a privacy budget based on the
desired level of privacy, and to split the budget for each query
that the data is subjected to.
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Figure 3: ARD study: actual quantitative findings from syn-
thetic data. Estimates of the most important regression coeffi-
cients for males (above) and females (below). The most relevant
coefficients highlighted with red in text. The {zi}10i=1 denote the
confounders of the regression model. Synthetic data results are
the means of the regression coefficients from 100 independent
synthetic data sets. Error bars: standard deviation among the 100
sets.
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Figure 4: Accuracy and computation speed of two models in
generating synthetic data (Carat study). For low-dimensional
discrete data Bayes networks are good, but as dimensionality
grows their computation time becomes intolerable and mixture
models more accurate. The solid lines denote the mean Frobenius
norm ((4)) between original and synthetic covariance matrices,
with error bars denoting the standard error of mean from 10
independent runs of the algorithm. The dashed lines show the
runtimes. Privacy budget was fixed to ( = 1.0, δ = 10−5).
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Figure 5: Accuracy of data synthesized with two models
(ARD study). Mixture models preserve regression coefficients
better than the Bayes network. The curves show mean absolute
error between original and the learned coefficients. Average over
100 runs. Error bars: standard error of mean.
Consider that the data holder splits the budget uniformly
among T anticipated queries. Figure 6a illustrates how the num-
ber of anticipated queries will affect the accuracy. We compared
the data sharing method against perturbing covariance matrix
with Gaussian noise, according to the Gaussian mechanism [11],
called “tailored mechanism” here. Already with T = 10 queries,
releasing a synthetic data set outperforms the tailored mechanism
in high dimensional examples.
As another example, we compared the synthetic data release
on the Adult data against a private logistic regression classi-
fier [17]. Figure 6b shows that the Bayes network consistently
outperforms the tailored mechanism, and in the high privacy
region also the mixture model performs better than the tailored
mechanism if data holder would prepare for 20 or more queries.
2.5 Breaking points
As discussed, the data release method benefits if a large number
of samples is available to accurately learn the underlying struc-
ture of the data. We can see this with the female case of the ARD
study. Figure 7 shows the rate of reproduced discoveries within
each medication type subgroup and for the combined female case.
It turned out to be more difficult to reproduce the discoveries for
female samples as opposed to males (see Figure 1). It seems that
the data sharing mechanism is able to preserve the correlation
structure in a way that the effect of diabetes to ARD is visible in
the synthetic data, but the variance of the coefficient estimates is
larger.
In the ARD study, each type of diabetes medication is treated
as an independent regressor. For a reproduced discovery, we
require that all of the regressors are positive and have sufficient
statistical significance (p < 0.05). From Figure 7 we see that
the probability of reproducing the discoveries for each subgroup
increases as the  grows. The reason why the smaller subgroup
“Insulin only” is more often captured with sufficient significance
than the largest subgroup “OAD only” can be explained by the
original regression coefficients shown in Table 1. The OAD
only subgroup has a significantly smaller effect on the ARD than
the Insulin only, thus making it more difficult for the mixture
model to capture it. However as we increase , the correlation
between OAD only and ARD is more often captured. Both of
these effects are also visible in the male case, as we see from
Figure 1, however in smaller scale.
3 Discussion
As we saw in the Adult example, the DP data release can perform
as well as the tailored mechanism even when answering just one
query, and progressively better for multiple queries. However,
as our experiments exemplify, the choice of the probabilistic
model has a clear impact on the results. In fact, what we are
proposing is essentially to transform the DP data release problem
into a modelling problem, which includes as an essential part the
selection of the model according to the data and task.
In the past, there has been discussion on whether the standard
random number generators (RNG) can be used to assure DP due
to limited accuracy of floating point arithmetic [21]. Also, in
the actual data release setting we would need to consider using
cryptographically secure RNGs to properly provide individuals
in the data set the DP guarantees. However, these problems are
by no means specific to the DP data release but apply to all DP
methods.
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(a) Performance of DP data release against tailored DP mechanism.
Carat study. The data sharing method outperforms the tailored mech-
anism as the number of anticipated future queries grows in terms of
classification accuracy. Curves show the Frobenius between original and
synthetic covariance matrices. Privacy budget was fixed to (1.0, 10−5).
Average of 10 runs. Errorbars denote the standard error of mean.
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(b) Performance as a function of required privacy guarantees
(Adult data). The Bayes network based data outperforms the tailored
mechanism. While a tailored mechanism is more accurate for loose
privacy guarantees (large ) and few queries (small T), also the mix-
ture model based data release is more accurate for multiple queries
and tighter privacy guarantees. Average classification accuracy over 10
independent runs. Error bars denote standard error of mean.
Figure 6: Performance against tailored mechanisms
Coefficient Number of cases Original coef. ± Std. Error ( = 1.0) coef. mean ± SD ( = 2.0) coef. mean ± SD ( = 4.0) coef. mean ± SD
OAD only 254 0.657± 0.108 0.303± 0.197 0.474± 0.209 0.591± 0.189
OAD+Insulin 12 0.873± 0.304 0.658± 0.516 0.846± 0.44 1.074± 0.427
Insulin only 117 1.68± 0.135 0.91± 0.379 1.085± 0.312 1.313± 0.293
Coefficient Number of cases Original coef. ± Std. Error ( = 1.0) coef. mean ± SD ( = 2.0) coef. mean ± SD ( = 4.0) coef. mean ± SD
OAD only 1052 0.435± 0.049 0.412± 0.166 0.502± 0.152 0.538± 0.12
OAD+Insulin 66 0.582± 0.129 0.748± 0.304 0.816± 0.282 0.858± 0.234
Insulin only 480 1.209± 0.063 1.033± 0.189 1.188± 0.205 1.257± 0.138
Table 1: ARD study, ABOVE : Females, BELOW : Males. The magnitude of the statistical effect in the male case is well
preserved in synthetic data. DP results are average over 100 runs, error denoting the standard deviation. The error in original
coefficients shows the standard error for the regression model.
We illustrated in Figure 2 how increasing the number of
relevant samples improves the results. As is common with all
differentially private methods, the data release works better when
the original data set has a large number of samples. This is
because of the nature of DP; it is easier to mask the contribution
of one element of the data set when the number of samples is
large.
Recently, Karwa et al. [18] showed that DP has a broaden-
ing effect on the confidence intervals of statistical quantities
learned under DP. Their proof was for Gaussian mean estima-
tion, however intuitively this property should translate to other
differentially private tasks as well. The width of the confidence
intervals depends on both the required level of privacy and the
number of samples. This suggests that we should not expect to
necessarily reproduce all the same discoveries under DP.
4 Conclusions
We have presented a privacy-preserving data sharing mechanism
that is applicable for arbitrary tabular data. Our data sharing
method allows an unlimited number of arbitrary tasks to be
performed on the synthetic data with no further privacy consider-
ations. This is especially beneficial for tasks for which there is no
existing privacy-preserving counterpart. Our results demonstrate
that the synthetic data maintains the usability of the original data
in non-trivial tasks.
5 Materials and methods
5.1 Materials
For the ARD study, the data came from 208 148 females and
226 372 males and comprised of three continuous, five binary
and two categorical features. Throughout the experiments the
privacy parameter δ was set to 10−6.
Carat data set: Carat [23] is a research project that maintains
a mobile phone app that helps users understand their battery
usage. We obtained a subset of Carat data from the research
project. Our aim was to privately release a data set that consists
of installed apps of 66 754 Carat users. The apps chosen to our
experiment were among the 10 000 most popular apps among
Carat users. In order to have some variance in the data, we
dropped out the 100 most popular apps that were installed on
almost every device and used the 96 next most popular apps to
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Figure 7: Likelihood of correct findings as a function of pri-
vacy requirement. ARD study, female case. The statistical
discoveries are reliably reproduced from the synthetic data for
the strictest privacy requirements. Results for combined case and
for each subgroup separately. Combined results: all subgroups
are required to have the correct sign and p < 0.05 to call the
discovery reproduced. The size of each subgroup is shown in
parenthesis.
subsample in the experiments.
In the Adult study of the UCI machine learning repository
[10], we trained the generative model with 30 162 samples with
13 features of both continuous and discrete types. Separate
test set consisted of 15 060 instances, out of which 75.4% were
labelled <50k$.
5.2 Probabilistic models
As we access the data only through the posterior distributions
of the model parameters, it suffices to learn these distributions
under DP. In our experiments we used two probabilistic models.
The mixture model,
p(X | θ,pi) =
K∑
k=1
pikp(X | θ(k)), (3)
is a universal approximator for densities. We learned the poste-
riors for θ and pi using the DPVI method [17]. DPVI learns a
mean field approximation for the posterior distributions of model
parameters using DP-SGD [1]. The number of mixture compo-
nents K was set to 10 for data with fewer dimensions (< 20) and
20 for data with more dimensions (≥ 20). This number, along
with hyperparameters of DPVI, could be optimized under DP
[19] with at potentially significant extra computational cost.
The second model we used was Bayes networks learned
using the PrivBayes method [28].
5.3 Model details
For the mixture model, we need to choose how to model each
feature in the data sets. In all our experiments we used the fol-
lowing distributions: Continuous features were scaled to the unit
interval and modelled as Beta distributed. The parameters for
Beta-distributed variables were given a Gamma(1, 1) prior. Dis-
crete features were modelled as either Bernoulli or Categorical
random variables based on the domain. Both in Bernoulli and
Categorical cases, the parameters were given a uniform prior.
The following Table gives the details of mixture models used
in the experiments:
Dataset K Variable types Details
ARD 10 Binary, Categorical, Beta Separate mixture models for
males and females and also
separation based on outcome
of the follow-up.
Carat 20 Binary All features were treated as
independent.
Adult 10 Binary, Categorical, Beta Separate mixture models for
high/low income.
5.4 Similarity measures
In the Carat experiments, we measured the performance in terms
of the similarity between the covariance matrices of the original
and synthetic data. Frobenius norm between two matrices A and
B is given as:
||A−B||F =
 n∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
(aij − bij)2
1/2 . (4)
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